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A b s t r a c t  
T h e  p r i m a r y  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h e  p a p e r  i s  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
P o w e r  P o l i t i c s  ( I P P )  o n  a d o p t i o n  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  
( / F R S )  i n  A f r i c a .  T h e  c l u s t e r  s a m p l i n g  a n d  s i m p l e  r a n d o m  s a m p l i n g  t e c h n i q u e s  w e r e  
a d o p t e d  i n  t h i s  s t u d y .  F r o m  a  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  f i f t y  f o u r  c o u n t r i e s  m a k i n g  u p  t h e  A f r i c a n  
c o n t i n e n t ,  a  s a m p l e  o f  f o r t y  s i x  c o u n t r i e s  w a s  s e l e c t e d .  A  c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l  d a t a  o f  
c o u n t r i e s  f o r  t h e  y e a r  2 0 1 1  w a s  c o l l e c t e d  f r o m  W o r l d  B a n k  w o r l d  d e v e l o p m e n t  
m d i c a t o r s  d a t a  b a s e  a n d  w o r l d  a l m a n a c  a n d  b o o k  o f  f a c t s .  T h e  d a t a  c o l l e c t e d  w e r e  
a n a l y s e d  u s i n g  t h e  o r d e r e d  l o g i s t i c  r e g r e s s i o n  t e c h n i q u e .  T h e  s t u d y  r e v e a l s  t h a t  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o w e r  p o l i t i c s  h a s  a  p o s i t i v e  b u t  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  ·  
a d o p t i o n  o f  / F R S  i n  A f n c a .  T h e  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  r e s u l t  i s  a  p o l i c y  s h i f t  t o w a r d s  
g r o w t h  i n  g r o s s  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t  i n  A f r i c a  a n d  t h e  n e e d  f o r  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
A c c o u n t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  ( I A S B )  t o  r e v i s i t  t h e  p r e s e n t  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f t l r e  b o a r d  o f  
t h e  I A S B  i f  a d o p t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  s t a n d a r d s  i s  t o  b e  e n h a n c e d  
i n  A f r i c a  
K e y w o r d s :  I F R S  A d o p t i o n ,  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  P o w e r  P o l i t i c s ,  G r o s s  
D o m e s t i c  P r o d u c t ,  P o p u l a t i o n ,  R e a s o n e d  
A c t i o n  
1 . 0  I N T R O D U C T I O N  
I n  t h e  l a s t  d e c a d e ,  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  
c a l l  b y  p r o f e s s i o n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  b o d i e s  
l i k e  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A c c o u n t i n g  
S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  ( I A S B )  f o r  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i O n  o f  a c c o u n t i n g  
s t a n d a r d s .  T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  
b e c o m i n g  m o r e  i n t e r c o n n e c t e d .  
C o r p o r a t i o n s  a r e  l o o k i n g  f o r  c a p i t a l  f o r  
e x p a n s i o n  a t  t h e  g l o b a l  l e v e l ,  w h i c h  
n e c e s s i t a t e s  a  u n i f o r m  a c c o u n t i n g  
s t a n d a r d  t o  m a k e  f o r  e a s e  i n  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a n d  i n t e r p r e t i n g  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s  a c r o s s  b o r d e r s .  
T h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A c c o u n t i n g  
S t a n d a r d  C o m m i t t e e  ( I A S C )  w a s  
f o u n d e d  m  J u n e  1 9 7 3  i n  L o n d o n  w i t h  t h e  
o b j e c t i v e  t o  f o r m u l a t e  a  u n i f o r m  s e t  o f  
g l o b a l  a c c o u n t i n g  s t a n d a r d s  a i m e d  a t  
r e d u c i n g  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  i n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  p r i n c i p l e s  a n d  
r e p o r t i n g  p r a c t i c e s .  T o  a c h i e v e  i t s  g o a l ,  
I A S C  p u b i i s h e d  s o m e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
A c c o u n t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  ( l A S s )  t o w a r d s  
c h a m p i o n i n g  t h e  u n i f o r m i t y  a n d  
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standardization of accounting principles 
(Carlson, 1997). In April 2001, the 
IASB took over the responsibility of 
setting of the standards from the IASC, 
and referred to the new standards as the 
International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) in addition to taking 
over the lASs in force. 
The decision on the part of a 
country to adopt or not to adopt these 
standards set by the IASB may be 
influenced by the political nature of 
international accounting standard setting 
and the influence a country has in 
explicit lobbying and pressure tactics in 
accepting to adopt or reject the IFRS 
product based on its population and 
gross domestic product (Ramanna & 
Sletten, 2009). 
Many studies have been 
conducted in developed countries with 
respect to IFRS adoption. These include 
USA (Ball, 2006; Epstein, 2009; 
Beneish, Miller & Yohn, 2010, Brochet, 
Jagolinzer & Riedi, 2013), and Europe 
(Cai & Wong, 2010, Horton, Serafeim & 
Serafeim, 2013). Compared to the 
developed economies, not much study 
(Owolabi & Iyoha, 2012) on IFRS 
adoption has been conducted in Africa. 
Added to the motivation for this study is 
the fact that most of the empirical 
literatures on IFRS adoption (e.g. Barth, 
Landsman & Lang, 2008; Gyasi, 2010) 
have focused on the determinants of IFRS 
adoption at the firm level. The firm level 
studies are conditional on countries' 
decision to allow or mandate IFRS 
(Marques-Ramos, 2008). This study 
complements the firm level studies by 
looking at the determinants of IFRS 
adoption at the country level. In this 
study, the year 2011 was used as the 
observation year. This is because official 
and reliable data for year 2012 for gross 
domestic product, which is used to proxy 
International Power Politics (IPP), is 
usually not available until towards the 
end of the succeeding year. The 
objective of the study is, therefore, to 
investigate the influence of IPP on 
adoption of IFRS in Africa. 
2.0 LITERATURE 
This section discusses the 
position in extant literature with respect 
to the relationship between IFRS 
adoption and IPP. Also covered in this 
section is the theory underpinning this 
study. 
International Power Politics and IFRS 
Adoption 
A sweeping change in accounting 
standards is likely to upset the balance of 
power between transacting parties. The 
extent to which these transacting parties 
can influence the political system is 
predicted to explain how quickly a 
country adopts IFRS; specifically, 
countries with more population and very 
high gross domestic product - and with , 
more influential lobbying activity, as · 
measured by the relation between legal 
political contributions and policy 
decisions - are expected to adopt IFRS 
later (Johnson, 2011). 
According to Gourevitch & 
Shinn (2005), where a country · is very 
influential and can veto legislative· 
change, it is less likely to change its 
national standards and embrace IFRS 
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a d o p t i o n .  R a m a n n a  a n d  S l e t t e n  ( 2 0 0 9 )  
a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  s u b m i s s i o n  o f  G o u r e v i t c h  
a n d  S h i n n ,  w h e n  t h e y  o p i n e  t h a t  I F R S  
a d o p t i o n  i s  d e l a y e d  i n  c o u n t r i e s  w h e r e  
l o b b y i n g  e f f o r t s  a r e  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e .  
T h e s e  s t u d i e s  t h o u g h  e m b r a c i n g  s t i l l  h a s  
t o  b e  r e a d  w i t h  c a u t i o n  b e c a u s e  t h e  
s a m p l e  s i z e  t a k e n  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n  o f  s t u d y  i s  g r o s s l y  
i n a d e q u a t e .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  R a m a n n a  a n d  
S l e t t e n  ( 2 0 0 9 )  t a k i n g  a  s a m p l e  s i z e  o f  
1 0 2  n o n - E U  c o u n t r i e s  i s  j u s t  n o t  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s  
m a k i n g  u p  A f r i c a ,  A s i a ,  N o r t h  A m e r i c a ,  
S o u t h  A m e r i c a ,  A n t a r c t i c a  a n d  
A u s t r a l i a .  
T h e  r o l e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s e s  i n  
a c c o u n t i n g  h a s  b e e n  e x p l o r e d  f o r  s o m e  
t i m e .  A c c o u n t i n g  b e c o m e s  c o n t e s t e d  i n  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  
i n f l u e n c e  o n  e c o n o m i c  b e h a v i o u r  ( B a l l ,  
K o t h a r i ,  &  R o b i n ,  2 0 0 3 ) .  T h i s  s t u d y  
c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  t h i s  l i n e  o f  r e s e a r c h  b y  
p r o v i d i n g  c r o s s - c o u n t r y  e v i d e n c e  o f  t h e  
i m p a c t  o f  I P P  o n  a  c o u n t r y ' s  d e c i s i o n  t o  
a d o p t  I F R S .  
I F R S  a d o p t i o n  h a s  f a r - r e a c h i n g  
r e - d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  e f f e c t s  f r o m  I F R S  
a d o p t i o n  t h a t  a f f e c t  m a n y  c o u n t r i e s ,  a n d  
t h e  p r i m a r y  b e n e f i c i a r y  s e e m s  t o  b e  
c o u n t r i e s  w h i c h  a r e  n o t  t o o  v i a b l e  
e c o n o m i c a l l y  ( B a l l ,  2 0 0 6 ) .  M u c h  o f  t h e  
s h i f t  i n  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p . o w e r  
f o l l o w i n g  I F R S  a d o p t i o n  r e s u l t s  f r o m  
i n c r e a s e d  t r a n s p a r e n c y  ( B a l l ,  2 0 0 6 ) .  
H o w e v e r ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  B a l l  ( 2 0 0 6 ) ,  I P P  
m a y  m a t e r  l e s s  i n  a d o p t i o n  o f  I F R S  t h a n  
i n  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .  
I n  h i s  s t u d y  o n  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m s ,  
l o b b y i n g  a n d  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  I F R S ,  
E m e n i  
J o h n s o n  ( 2 0 1 1 )  f i n d s  t h a t  I P P  i n f l u e n c e  
t h e  r a t e  a t  w h i c h  c o u n t r i e s  a d o p t  I F R S .  
I n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a c c o u n t i n g  
s y s t e m s  a r e  t i e d  t o  o w n e r s h i p  s t r u c t u r e s ,  
w h i c h  a r e  i n  t u m  t i e d  t o  p o l i t i c a l  
s y s t e m s ,  J o h n s o n  ( 2 0 1 1 )  a n a l y s i s  f i n d s  
t h a t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  v e t o  
p l a y e r s  a n d  e c o n o m i c  s t r e n g t h  m o d e r a t e  
t h e  p a c e  o f  I F R S  a d o p t i o n .  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  B r a c k n e y  a n d  
W i t n e r  ( 2 0 0 5 )  c o u n t r i e s  e x p e c t i n g  t h e  
E U  t o  h a v e  a  d o m i n a n t  r o l e  i n  I A S B  
a f f a i r s ,  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  t o  c e d e  s o m e  
a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  t o  E U  
i n t e r e s t s .  C e d i n g  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  l o c a l  
s t a n d a r d s  i s ,  i n  t u m ,  l i k e l y  t o  b e  l e s s  
p a l a t a b l e  t o  m o r e  p o w e r f u l  c o u n t r i e s ,  
w h i c h  l e a d s  t o  t h e  s u b m i s s i o n  t h a t  m o r e  
p o w e r f u l  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  
e m b r a c e  I F R S .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e y  c o n c l u d e d  
t h a t  I F R S  a d o p t i o n  i s  p o s i t i v e l y  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o w e r  
p o l i t i c s .  L i k e w i s e ,  R a m a n n a  a n d  S l e t t e n ,  
( 2 0 0 9 )  e x p a n d  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  
d e t e r m i n a n t s  a n d  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  I F R S  
a d o p t i o n  t o  a  m o r e  g l o b a l  s a m p l e  o f  1 0 2  
c o u n t r i e s ,  w h e r e  t h e y  f i n d  a m o n g s t  
o t h e r s  ( 1 )  n o  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  
a n d  e x p e c t e d  c h a n g e s  i n  f o r e i g n  
i n v e s t m e n t  a n d  t r a d e  a f f e c t  t h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  a d o p t i o n  ( 2 )  m o r e  p o w e r f u l  
c o u n t r i e s  a r e  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  a d o p t  I F R S  
a n d  ( 3 )  r e g i o n a l  t r e n d  i n  I F R S  a d o p t i o n .  
T h e o r e t i c a l  F r a m e w o r k  
I n  a d d r e s s i n g  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  
t h i s  s t u d y ,  t h e  r e s e a r c h e r  r e l i e s  o n  t h e  
t h e o r y  o f  r e a s o n e d  a c t i o n  ( A j z e n ,  1 9 9 1 )  
t o  b u i l d  a  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  f r a m e w o r k  t h a t  
i s  c a p a b l e  o f  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  r e l a t 1 0 n s h 1 p  
b e t w e e n  I F R S  a d o p t i o n  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
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power politics. The theory of reasoned 
action posits that accessible behaviourai 
beliefs influence attitude toward 
behaviour and accessible normative 
beliefs influence subjective norm (Ajzen, 
2002). Research across behaviours like 
cross-country study generally found 
strong support for the theory of reasoned 
action (Sheppard, Hartwick, & 
Warshaw, 1988). The reason for choice 
of the theory of reasoned action in this 
study is because it is expected that, there 
must be a reason why a country chooses 
to take an action and invariably enhance 
the political power of the state, whether 
for the purpose of expansion or for the 
purpose of protection from expansionist 
tendencies of other states (Mearsheimer, 
2001). 
Based on the above, the 
relationship between IFRS adoption and 
IPP can therefore, be analyzed as the 
behavioural beliefs which influence 
attitude toward behaviour. With respect 
to adoption of IFRS, the net political 
value, that is, subjective utility of IFRS, 
is the benefit arising from the potential 
political nature of international 
accounting standard setting. If IFRS 
standard setting can be influenced by 
political lobbying, more powerful 
counties are more likely to be able to 
shape IFRS may be because of their 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or size of 
their population. 
ADP = f (IPP) 
Where; ADP = IFRS adoption 
IPP = international power politics 
3.0 METHODOLOGY 
The survey research method was 
adopted in this study. The reason is that 
the researcher wants to reach to data on 
several · countries on the African 
continent and the data was collected at a 
particular point in time; therefore the 
researcher was involved in a cross-
sectional survey research design. The 
research population comprised the 54 
countries in Africa. A survey of the 
sampled countries with respect to the 
determinants of IFRS adoption was 
carried out. The sample size is 46 
countries. The reason for taking a 
sample size of 46 countries is to ensure 
robustness of the study and 
representativeness of the sample. 
The sample was arrived at by 
using the Y amani formula as follows: 
n= N/1+N(e)2 
Where n = sample size sought 
N = population 
e = error limit (0.05 on the basis of 
95% confidence level) 
The sample size is therefore: 
n = 54 I 1 + 54(0.05)2 
or n = 46 
The cluster sampling technique was 
adopted m this study. This was 
63 
c o m p l e m e n t e d  w i t h  t h e  s i m p l e  r a n d o m  
s a m p l i n g  t e c h n i q u e .  T h e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  
c h o i c e  o f  t h e  c l u s t e r  s a m p l i n g  t e c h n i q u e  
i s  t h a t  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  s t u d y  ( t h e  5 4  
c o u n t r i e s  m a k i n g  u p  A f r i c a )  i s  
d i s t r i b u t e d  i n  f i v e  c l u s t e r s / r e g i o n s .  
C l u s t e r  s a m p l i n g  t e c h n i q u e  w i l l  
t h e r e f o r e  m a k e  f o r  p r o p o r t i o n a l  s e l e c t i o n  
o f  s a m p l e s  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  
s u b j e c t s  s e l e c t e d  f r o m  e a c h  r e g i o n  w i l l  
r e p r e s e n t  i t s  s h a r e  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  
p o p u l a t i o n .  F o r  e a c h  c o u n t r y  i n  a  g i v e n  
c l u s t e r / r e g i o n  t o  h a v e  e q u a l  c h a n c e  o f  
b e i n g  s e l e c t e d ,  t h e  s i m p l e  r a n d o m  
s a m p l i n g  t e c h n i q u e  w a s  t h e n  i n t r o d u c e d .  
T h e  c l u s t e r s  a r e ;  W e s t  A f r i c a  ( 1 6  
c o u n t r i e s ) ,  E a s t  A f r i c a  ( 1 6  c o u n t r i e s ) ,  
M i d d l e  A f r i c a  ( 9  c o u n t r i e s ) ,  S o u t h e r n  
A f r i c a  ( 6  c o u n t r i e s )  a n d  N o r t h  A f r i c a  ( 7  
c o u n t r i e s ) .  T h e  n e x t  s t e p  i n  t h e  s a m p l i n g  
w a s  t o  n u m b e r  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  e a c h  o f  
t h e  c l u s t e r s  i n  t h e  a d e q u a t e  r a n g e .  W e s t  
A f r i c a  w a s  n u m b e r e d  0 1  t o  1 6 ;  E a s t  
A f r i c a  0 1  t o  1 6 ;  M i d d l e  A f r i c a  0 1  t o  9 ;  
S o u t h e r n  A f r i c a  0 1  t o  0 6 ;  a n d  N o r t h  
A f r i c a  0 1  t o  0 7 .  A f t e r  w h i c h ,  a  c o m p u t e r  
p a c k a g e  ( E x c e l )  w a s  p r o g r a m m e d  t o  
s e l e c t  4 6  r a n d o m  n u m b e r s  w i t h i n  t h e  
s p e c i f i e d  r a n g e s  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e  
c l u s t e r ' s  s h a r e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n .  
T h e  n u m b e r s  t h u s  g e n e r a t e d  w e r e  u s e d  
t o  c h o o s e  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  
s t u d y  s a m p l e .  
M o d e l  
A s  e a r l i e r  p o i n t e d  o u t  a b o v e ,  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  I F R S  a d o p t i o n ,  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  
r e a s o n e d  a c t i o n  p o s i t s  t h a t  a c c e s s i b l e  
b e h a v i o u r a l  b e l i e f s  i n f l u e n c e  a t t i t u d e  
t o w a r d  b e h a v i o u r ,  w h i c h  m a y  b e  t o  h a v e  
i n f l u e n c e  ( p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r )  o v e r  
E m e n i  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g .  
T h e  r e a s o n e d  a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  I P P  i n  I F R S  s e t t i n g  c a n  t h e n  
b e  s t a t e d  a s :  
A D P  =  f  ( I P P )  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ( 1 )  
A s s u m i n g  a  l i n e a r  r e l a : t i o n s h i p  
a n d  t a k i n g  i n t o  c o n g n i s a n c e  s o m e  
c o n t r o l  v a r i a b l e s ,  w e  c a n  w r i t e  t h e  a b o v e  
e q u a t i o n  ( 1 )  i n  a n  e x p l i c i t  f u n c t i o n a l  
f o r m  a s :  
A D P  =  J 3 o  +  J 3 I  I P P  +  J 3 z  P O P  + J 3 3  
C U L  +  U  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ( 2 )  
W h e r e :  
P O P  ( p o p u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y )  
a n d  C U L  ( c u l t u r a l  a f f i n i t y  t o  E u r o p e  -
t h e  c o u n t r y  o f f e r i n g  t h e  I F R S  p r o d u c t )  
a r e  c o n t r o l  v a r i a b l e s  ( s e e  a p p e n d i x )  
J 3 o ,  J 3 I ,  J 3 z ,  a n d  f 3 3  a r e  p a r a m e t e r s  
t o  b e  e s t i m a t e d .  T h e  a p r i o r i  e x p e c t a t i o n  
i s  t h a t ;  
J 3 I  >  0 ,  J 3 z >  0  a n d  ( 3 3 >  0  
N o t e  t h a t  ' U '  i s  t h e  e r r o r  t e r m  a n d  J 3 o  i s  
t h e  c o n s t a n t  t e r m .  
I n  t h i s  s t u d y ,  d a t a  w e r e  c o l l e c t e d  
f r o m  s e c o n d a r y  s o u r c e s .  G D P  d a t a  w a s  
s o u r c e d  f r o m  W o r l d  B a n k  W o r l d  
D e v e l o p m e n t  I n d i c a t o r s  ( W D I )  d a t a  
b a s e ;  d a t a  f o r  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  c o u n t r i e s  
w a s  s o u r c e d  f r o m  t h e  W o r l d  A l m a n a c  
a n d  B o o k  o f  F a c t s  ( W  A B F ) ;  d a t a  f o r  
c u l t u r a l  a f f i n i t y  w a s  t a k e n  a s  t h e  
n u m b e r  o f  y e a r s  a  c o u n t r y  h a s  g a i n e d  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  f r o m  i t s  c o l o n i a l  m a s t e r s  
( R a m a n n a  &  S l e t t e n ,  2 0 0 9 )  w h i c h  w a s  
a l s o  s o u r c e d  f r o m  W  A B F .  
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The dependent variable are in 
five categories. Category zero (0) to four 
(4); where: Zero (0) means decision not 
to adopt IFRS by the country; one (1) 
means efforts to implement !FRS is still 
being identified by the country; two (2) 
means publicly listed entitles and 
significant public interest entities are to 
prepare their financial statements using 
applicable IFRS, three (3) means all 
other public interest entities mandatorily 
adopts IFRS for statutory purposes; and 
four (4) means Small and Medium-sized 
Entities (SMEs) mandatorily adopt 
IFRS. 
The ordered logistic regression 
analysis was used to regress decision to 
adopt IFRS in relation to its predictor 
(IPP). According to Pallant (2011) 
logistic regression allows one to test 
models to predict categorical outcomes 
with two or more categories in the 
dependent variable. 
4.0RESULTS 
This sectjo,n: contains analysis 
and interpretation of the empirical 




D e p e n d e n t  
V a r i a b l e :  A D P  
M e t h o d :  M L  
O r d e r e d  L o g i t  
I n c l u d e d  
o b s e r v a t i o n s :  4 6  
N u m b e r  o f  
o r d e r e d  i n d i c a t o r  
v a l u e s :  5  
C o n v e r g e n c e  a c h i e v e d  a f t e r  5  
i t e r a t i o n s  
R e g r e s s i o n  r e s u l t s  
V a r i a b l e  
I P P  
P O P  
C U L  
C o e f f i c i e n t  
0 . 0 0 1 4 9 9  
1 . 0 7 4 3 6 8  
- 0 . 0 6 5 4 3 5  
E m e n i  
S t d .  e r r o r  
z - s t a t i s t i c  P r o b a b i l i t y  
0 . 0 0 4 8 8 8  
0 . 3 0 6 7 2 8  0 . 7 5 9 1  
1 . 0 3 5 0 3 3  0 . 2 1 2 4 6 1  0 . 7 0 3 2  
0 . 0 3 6 1 6  - 0 . 6 4 4 1 2 1  0 . 6 6 3 1  
A v g .  
l o g  
I  L R  s t a t i s t i c  
8 . 3 2 4 2 3 3  l i k e l i h o o d  
I  2 4 3 5 0  
P r o b ( L R  
s t a t i s t i c )  0 . 0 2 1 3 6 2  
S o u r c e :  A u t h o r ' s  c o m p u t a t i o n ,  2 0 1 3  
T h e  a b o v e  t a b u l a r  r e s u l t s  c a n  b e  
r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  a n  e q u a t i o n  f o r m  a s  
s h o w n  b e l o w :  
A D P  =  J 3 o  +  J 3 I  I P P  +  J 3 2  P O P  +  J 3 3  C U I  
+  u  0 . 0 0 1 4 9 9  1 . 0 7 4 3 6 8  - 0 . 0 6 5 4 3 5  
I n  t h i s  s t u d y  e a c h  s l o p e  c o e f f i c i e n t  
m e a s u r e s  t h e  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  l o g i t  
f o r  a  u n i t  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  g i v e n  
r e g r e s s o r  ( h o l d i n g  o t h e r  r e g r e s s o r s  
c o n s t a n t ) .  T h u s ,  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  ( P O P )  
c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  1 . 0 7 4 3 6 8  m e a n s  w i t h  o t h e r  
v a r i a b l e s  h e l d  c o n s t a n t  t h a t  i f  P O P  
i n c r e a s e s  b y  a  u n i t  o n  a v e r a g e  t h e  
e s t i m a t e d  l o g i t  h a s  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  
i n c r e a s i n g  b y  a b o u t  1 . 0 7  u n i t s ,  t h u s  
s u g g e s t i n g  a  p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o .  A s  w e  c a n  s e e .  a l s o ,  i f  
I P P  i n c r e a s e s  b y  l e s s  t h a n  1 %  a  u n i t  o n  
a v e r a g e ,  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  l o g i t  h a s  t h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  b y  a b o u t  0 . 0 0 2  
u n i t s ,  s u g g e s t i n g  a  p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o .  H o w e v e r ,  c u l t u r a l  
a f f i n i t y  ( C U L )  h a s  a  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  o n  
t h e  l o g i t ,  t h a t  i s ,  i f  C U L  i n c r e a s e s  b y  a  
u n i t ,  o n  t h e  a v e r a g e  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  l o g i t  
h a s  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  r e d u c i n g  b y  0 . 0 6 5  
u n i t s ,  s u g g e s t i n g  a  n e g a t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o .  
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From the ordered logistic 
regression result above, all the variables 
appeared not to be statistically 
significant at 5% level. Meanwhile, 
statistically the effect of IPP and a 
country's population is positively 
associated with IFRS adoption in Africa. 
HYPOTHESIS TEST 
The following hypothesis was 
specified for the study: 
Ho: International power politics has 
no significant relationship with 
adoption of IFRS in Africa. 
H1: International power politics has 
significant relationship with 
adoption of IFRS in Africa. 
Decision rule: if the calculated z-value 
for IPP (0.306728) is less than the table 
z-value (1.96), 
the null hypothesis of no significant 
relationship should be accepted and 
vice- versa, given the probability of 
0.7591 for IPP which is greater than 5% 
significance level. 
From the analysis conducted, we 
observe that the evaluation of the slope 
coefficients of the explanatory variables 
reveals that IPP impacted positively on 
IFRS adoption as depicted by the long 
run slope coefficient (0.306728). 
However, it is not statistically significant 
at 5% level ( p=0.00<0.05). Just as in the 
case of the population of a country 
enumerated above, there is the likelihood 
of IPP not to be significantly associated 
with IFRS adoption in Africa. This 
shows that African countries have no 
influence when it comes to adoption of 
IFRS. Hence, the null hypothesis (Ho) of 
no significant relationship between IPP 
and IFRS adoption is accepted while we 
reject the alternative hypothesis (Ht). 
The above result is an interesting 
one. It points to the relative weakness of 
African economies in respect of the 
major indices in the IPP variable. These 
indices are the productive capacity 
measured by high Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) or lobbyist ability. These 
two indices are characteristically low in 
the African economies. Lobbyist 
capacity is seriously determined by the 
productivity capacity of the economy. 
Thus the small economies may not wield 
enough lobbyist influence. 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The statistical test of the null 
hypothesis at 5% level showed that IPP 
is positively related to IFRS adoption but 
there is no significant relationship 
between both. Our finding is consistent 
with that of Ball's (2006) that IPP may 
mater less in adoption of IFRS than in 
implementation. However, Brackney and 
Witner (2005), Ramanna and Sletten 
. (2009) and Johnson (2011) findings 
contradict the finding in this study. 
According to Brackney and Witner 
(2005) countries expecting the EU to 
have a dominant role in IASB affairs, are 
likely to have to cede some authority 
over standard setting to EU interests. 
Ceding authority over local standards is, 
in turn, likely to be less palatable to · 
more powerful countries, which leads to 
the submission that more powerful 
countries are less likely to embrace 
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I F R S .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e y  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  
I F R S  a d o p t i o n  i s  p o s i t i v e l y  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o w e r  p o l i t i c s ,  w h i c h  
i s  i n  t a n d e m  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  s t u d y .  
L i k e w i s e ,  R a m a n n a  a n d  S l e t t e n  
( 2 0 0 9 )  t a k i n g  a  s a m p l e  o f  1 0 2  n o n - E U  
c o u n t r i e s  f o u n d  t h a t  m o r e  p o w e r f u l  
c o u n t r i e s  a r e  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  a d o p t  I F R S ,  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  m o r e  p o w e r f u l  c o u n t r i e s  
b e i n g  l e s s  w i l l i n g  t o  s u r r e n d e r  s t a n d a r d -
s e t t i n g  a u t h o r i t y  t o  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
b o d y ;  a n d  J o h n s o n  ( 2 0 1 1 )  o p i n e s  t h a t  
I P P  i n f l u e n c e s  t h e  r a t e  a t  w h i c h  
c o u n t r i e s  a d o p t  I F R S ,  i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  a c c o u n t i n g  s y s t e m s  a r e  t i e d  t o  
o w n e r s h i p  s t r u c t u r e s ,  w h i c h  a r e  m  t u m  
t i e d  t o  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m s .  J o h n s o n  ( 2 0 1 1 )  
g o e s  f u r t h e r  t o  s a y  t h a t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  
n u m b e r  o f  v e t o  p l a y e r s  a n d  e c o n o m i c  
s t r e n g t h  m o d e r a t e  t h e  p a c e  o f  I F R S  
a d o p t i o n .  
T h e  r e s u l t  i n  A f r i c a  a s  t o  t h e  
n o n - s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  I P P  
a n d  I F R S  a d o p t i o n  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g .  T h e  
r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  m a y  b e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  
p e c u l i a r  n a t u r e  o f  A f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  
g i v e n  t h e  ' s m a l l n e s s '  i n  t h e i r  g r o s s  
d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t  p e r  c a p i t a  a n d  
i n v a r i a b l y ,  w e a k  l o b b y i n g  a b i l i t y  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y ,  w h i c h  m a k e  t h e  t h e o r y  
o f  r e a s o n e d  a c t i o n  n o t  t o o  e v i d e n t  o n  t h e  
A f r i c a n  c o n t i n e n t .  
C O N C L U S I O N  
T h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h i s  s t u d y  i s  t o  
a s c e r t a i n  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  I F R S  
a d o p t i o n  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o w e r  
p o l i t i c s .  T h e  t h e o r y  o f  r e a s o n e d  a c t i o n  
w a s  u s e d  t o  d e v e l o p  t h e  h y p o t h e s e s  
t e s t e d  i n  t h i s  s t u d y .  T h e  c o n c l u s i o n  i n  
t h i s  s t u d y  w a s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  o v e r a l l  r e s u l t  
E m e n i  
o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  o n  A f r i c a .  
B a s e d  o n  t h e  o v e r a l l  r e s u l t ,  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  c o n c l u s i o n  i s  r e a c h e d :  T h e r e  
w a s  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o w e r  
p o l i t i c s  i s  p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  I F R S  
a d o p t i o n  b u t  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  
i n f l u e n c i n g  I F R S  a d o p t i o n  d e c i s i o n  
a m o n g s t  A f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
t h e  s t u d y  f a i l e d  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  
h y p o t h e s i s .  
P O L I C Y  I M P L I C A T I O N  
T h e  f i n d i n g s  i n  t h i s  s t u d y  h a v e  
s o m e  i n t e r e s t i n g  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  p o l i c y  
m a k i n g .  T h e  r e s u l t  s h o w s  t h a t  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  I F R S  a d o p t i o n  a n d  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o w e r  p o l i t i c s  i s  n o t  
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h e r e b y  p o i n t i n g  
t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e  w e a k n e s s  o f  A f r i c a n  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  I P P .  T h e  m a j o r  i n d i c e s  i n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o w e r  p o l i t i c s  a r e  t h e  
p r o d u c t i v e  c a p a c i t y  m a r k e d  b y  h i g h  
G D P  a n d  l o b b y i s t  a b i l i t y .  T h e s e  t w o  
i n d i c e s  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  l o w  o n  t h e  
A f r i c a n  e c o n o m i e s .  T h i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  c a l l s  
f o r  a  p o l i c y  s h i f t  t o w a r d s  g r o w t h  i n  
g r o s s  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t  i n  A f r i c a ,  i f  
a d o p t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  s t a n d a r d s  i s  t o  b e  e n h a n c e d  i n  
A f r i c a .  
P O L I C Y  R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S  
B a s e d  o n  t h e  f o r e g o i n g ,  t h e  s t u d y  
r e c o m m e n d s  a s  f o l l o w s .  
1 .  A l l  r e l e v a n t  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s  
s h o u l d  b e  p u t  i n  p l a c e  t o  e n h a n c e  
p r o d u c t i v i t y  a n d  i n v a r i a b l y  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o w e r  p o l i t i c s  o f  
A f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  e a s y  
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monetary and fiscal policy could 
be applied on industrialists and 
other producers to enhance output 
production in these sectors. 
Aggregate demand can also be 
encouraged by the same policy on 
the fiscal side. 
2. Given the positive relationship 
between IFRS adoption and 
international power politics in 
accounting standards setting, the 
insignificant relationship 
notwithstanding, there is the need 
for lASB to revisit the present 
composition of the board of the 
IASB where, apart from South 
America, ali other major continents 
(Asia, Europe and North America) 
have fow· permanent members 
each, whii~ Atrica has oil·y a 
singlr African representative. 
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C P A  J o u r n a l ,  N o v e m b e r  i s s u e ,  
h t t p : / / w w w . n y s s c p a .  o r g / c p a j o u r n  
a l l  2 0 0 5 / 1 0 0 5 / i n ( o c u s / p 2 0 . h t m .  
[ R e t r i e v e d  2 4  A u g u s t ,  2 0 1 2 ]  
B r o c h e t ,  F . D . ,  J a g o l i n z e r ,  A .  &  R i e d i ,  
E . J .  ( 2 0 1 3 ) .  M a n d a t o r y  I F R S  
a d o p t i o n  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  
c o m p a r a b i l i t y .  C o n t e m p o r a r y  
A c c o u n t i n g  R e s e a r c h ,  V o l .  3 0 ,  4 ,  
1 3 7 3 - 1 4 0 0 .  
C a i ,  F .  &  W o n g ,  H .  ( 2 0 1 0 ) .  T h e  e f f e c t s  
o f  I F R S  a d o p t i o n  o n  g l o b a l  
c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  i n t e g r a t i o n .  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  b u s i n e s s  a n d  
e c o n o m i c  r e s e a r c h  j o u r n a l ,  9  
( 1  0 ) ,  2 5 - 3 4 ,  
h t t p : / / j o u r n a l s . c h i t e o n l i n e . c o m / i n  
d e x .  [ R e t r i e v e d  1 3  J u l y ,  2 0 1 2 ]  
E p s t e i n ,  B . J .  ( 2 0 0 9 ) .  T h e  e c o n o m i c  
e f f e c t s  o f  I F R S  a d o p t i o n .  T h e  
C P A  J o u m a l , M a r c h ,  2 6 - ' H .  
h t t p : / / w w w . i f r s a c c o u n t a n t . c o m . p  
d f  . .  [ R e t r i e v e d  2 0  J u n e ,  2 0 1 2 ]  
G o u r e v i t c h ,  P . A .  &  S h i n n  ( 2 0 0 5 ) .  
P o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  a n d  c o r p o r a t e  
c o n t r o l :  t h e  n e w  g l o b a l  p o l i t i c s  
o f  c o r p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e .  
P r i n c e t o n ,  N J :  P r i n c e t o n  
U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s .  
G y a s i ,  A . K .  ( 2 0 1 0 ) .  A d o p t i o n  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
s t a n d a r d s  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s .  u n P u b l i s h e d  M . S c .  
T h e s i s ,  V a a s a  A m m a t i k o r k e a k o u h i  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  A p p l i e d  S c i e n c e s .  
H o r t o n ,  J . ,  S e r a f e i m ,  G .  &  S e r a f e i m ,  L .  
( 2 0 1 3 ) . D o e s  m a n d a t o r y  I F R S  
a d o p t i o n  i m p r o v e  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  
e n v i r o n m e n t ?  C o n t e m p o r a r y  
E m e n i  
A c c o u n t i n g  R e s e a r c h ,  V o l .  3 0 ,  1 ,  
3 8 8 - 4 2 3 .  
J o h n s o n ,  D .  ( 2 0 1 1 ) .  P o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m s ,  
l o b b y i n g ,  a n d  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
s t a n d a r d s .  E l e c t r o n i c  c o p y  
a v a i l a b l e  a t :  
h t t p : / / s s m . c o m / a b s t r a c t = l 7 5 3 2 2  
5 .  [ R e t r i e v e d  1 2  S e p t e m b e r ,  
2 0 1 2 ]  
M a r q u e s - R a m o s ,  L . M .  ( 2 0 0 8 ) .  T h e  
e f f e c t s  o f  I F R S  a d o p t i o n  o n  t r a d e  
a n d  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t s ,  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  a n d  f i n a n c e  
a s s o c i a t i o n .  W o r k i n g  p a p e r ,  N o .  
9 .  
M e a r s h e i m e r ,  J  . J .  ( 2 0 0  1  ) .  T h e  t r a g e d y  o f  
g r e a t  p o w e r  p o l i t i c s .  N e w  Y o r k :  
W . W .  N o r t o n .  
O w o l a b i ,  A .  &  F .  I y o h a  ( 2 0 1 2 ) .  
A d o p t i n g  I F R S  i n  A f r i c a :  
B e n e f i t s ,  p r o s p e c t s  a n d  
c h a l l e n g e s .  A f r i c a n  J o u r n a l  o f  
A c c o u n t i n g ,  A u d i t i n g  a n d  
F i n a n c e .  V o l .  1 ,  1 ,  7 7 - 8 6 .  
P a l l a n t  ( 2 0 1 1 ) .  S P S S  s u r v i v a l  m a n u a l ,  
4
1 1 1  
e d . ,  w o r d p r e s s . c o m - c i k g u  
a m i r u l .  
R a m a n n a ,  K .  &  E .  S l e t t e n  ( 2 0 0 9 ) .  W h y  
d o  c o u n t r i e s  a d o p t  I F R S ?  
W o r k i n g  p a p e r ,  2 .  H a r v a r d  
B u s i n e s s  S c h o o l .  
S h e p p a r d ,  B .  H . ,  J .  H a r t w i c k ,  &  P .  R .  
7 0  
W a r s h a w  ( 1 9 8 8 ) .  T h e  t h e o r y  o f  
r e a s o n e d  a c t i o n :  a  m e t a - a n a l y s i s  
o f  p a s t  r e s e a r c h  w i t h  
r~commendations f o r  
m o d i f i c a t i o n s  a n d  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h .  
J o u r n a l  o f  c o n s u m e r  r e s e a r c h ,  

































List of Status/ Population 
Countries in adoption as at last Coloni 
zed Colonizer 
SIN Africa date GDPinUSD census 
APPENDIX 
SAMPLED COUNTRIES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS 
IFRS 
Adoption 
List of Status/ Populatfon Date 
Countries in adoption as at last Coloni 
SIN Africa date GDPinUSD census zed Colonizer 
West Africa 
Not 
I Benin Permitted 7,294,865,847 9,099,922 1904 France 
Not 
2 Burkina Faso Permitted 10,187,211,704 16,967,845 1896 France 
Not 
3 Cape Verde Permitted 1,901,136,230 500,585 1462 Portugal 
Cote d'lvoire Not 
4 (Ivory Coast) Permitted 24,073,812,829 20,152,894 1842 France 
Gambia 
5 (The) 2009 898,282,866 1,776,103 1588 Britain 
Britain and 
6 Ghana 2007 39,199,656,051 24,965,816 1844 Germany 
United 
Not States(indi 
7 Liberia Permitted 1 ,545 ,461,660 4,128,572 rectly) 
8 Mali 2010 10,589,925,352 15,839,538 1898 France 
9 Nigeria 2012 243,985,812,280 162,470,737 1861 Britain 
Not France/Por 
10 Senegal Permitted 14,291 ,456,855 12,767,556 1890 tugues 
II Sierra Leone 2006 2,242,960,927 5,997,486 1787 Britian 
Not Germany; 




















1 3  B u r u n d i  
2 0 0 4  
2 , 3 2 5 . 9 7 1 , 1 4 4  
8 , 5 7 5 , 1 7 2  
1  1 9 1 6  
B e l g i u m  1 9 6 2  4 9  
N o t  
1 4  E r i t r e a  
P e r m i t t e d  
2 . 6 0 8 , 7 1 5 . 4 - t ?  
5 . 4 1 5 . 2 8 0  
1 8 9 0  E t h i o p i a  1 9 9 3  
1 8  
1 5  
E t h i o p i a  
2 0 1 0  
3 0 , 2 4 7 , 3 5 9 , 6 4 2  
8 4 , 7 3 4 , 2 6 2  
I t a l y  
1 9 4 1  7 0  
1 6  
K e n y a  
2 0 0 5  
3 3 , 6 2 0 , 6 8 4 , 0 1 6  4 1 , 6 0 9 , 7 2 8  
1 8 9 0  B r i t a i n  
1 9 6 3  4 8  
1 7  
M a d a g a s c a r  2 0 0 5  
9 , 9 l l , 7 8 1 , 2 9 7  2 1 , 3 1 5 , 1 3 5  
1 8 8 5  F r a n c e  1 9 6 0  5 1  
1 8  M a l a w i  
2 0 0 5  5 , 6 2 1 , 0 0 0 , 6 7 8  
1 5 , 3 8 0 , 8 8 8  1 8 9 1  
B r i t a i n  1 9 6 4  4 7  
F r a n e / B r i t  
1 9  
M a u r i t i u s  
2 0 0 5  1 1  , 2 5 9 , 8 5 6 , 3 0  I  1 , 2 8 6 , 0 5 1  
1 7 2 1  a i n  1 9 6 8  4 3  
-
. .  
2 0  R w a n d a  2 0 0 8  6 , 3 7 4 , 8 7 7 , 4 6 8  1 0 , 9 4 2 , 9 5 0  
B e l g i u m  1 % 2  
4 9  
- ·  
2 1  S e y c h e l l e s  
2 0 0 9  
I  , 0 0 7 , 1 8 6 , 2 9 2  8 6 , 0 0 0  1 7 9 4  
B r i t a i n  1 9 7 6  3 5  
2 2  T a n z a n i a  2 0 0 4  2 3 , 8 7 4 , 1 6 5 , 0 4 7  4 6 , 2 1 8 , 4 8 6  1 8 8 0  B r i t a i n  1 % 3  4 8  
I  
2 3  
U g i . i n d a  
2 0 0 4  1 6 . 8 0 9 , 6 2 3 , 4 8 9  
3 4 , 5 0 9 , 2 0 5  
1 8 9 4  
B r i t a i n  
1 9 6 2  4 9  
N o n  
A n g l o -
1 2 , 7 9 7 , 7 5 4 , 2  2 3 , 9 2 9 ,  P o r t u  
2 4  M o z a m b i q u e  2 0 0 8  S a x o n  
3 1  7 0 9  




2 5  Z a m b i a  2 0 0 5  
1 9 , 2 0 6 , 0 4 4 , 9 3 2  
1 3 , 4 7 4 , 9 5 9  1 8 8 9  B r i t a i n  
1 % 4  4 7  
.  
M i d d l e  A f r i c a  
2 6  A n g o l a  
.  
2 0 0 9  
1 0 4 , 3 3 1 , 6 1 3 , 3 3 7  
1 9 , 6 1 8 , 4 3 2  1 5 8 3  P o r t u g a l  
1 9 7 5  3 6  
G e r m a n y ;  
F r a n c e  a n d  
2 7  C a m e r o o n  
2 0 0 9  
2 5 , 2 3 5 , 7 4 7 , 2 1 2  
2 0 , 0 3 0 , 3 6 2  1 8 8 4  
B r i t a i n  
1 % 0  5 1  
C e n t r a l  
A f r i c a n  N o t  
2 8  
R e p u b l i c  
P e r m i t t e d  
2 , 1 9 4 , 7 2 0 , 0 0 4  
4 . 4 8 6 , 8 3 7  
F r a n c e  
I % 0  
5 1  
2 9  
C h a d  
2 0 0 9  
9 , 4 8 5 , 7 4 1 . 5 4 1  
1 1 , 5 2 5 , 4 9 6  1 9 0 0  
F r a n c e  
1 9 6 0  
5 1  
C o n g o  
N o t  
3 0  
( B r a z z a v i l l e )  
P e r m i t t e d  
1 4 . 4 2 5 , 6 0 6 , 7 9 3  
4 . 1 3 9 , 7 4 8  
F r a n c e  1 % 0  
5 1  
C o n g o ,  
D e m o c r a t i c  
N o t  
3 1  
R e p u b l i c  
P e r m i t t e d  
1 5 , 6 5 3 , 6 3 4 , 0 4 2  
6 7 , 7 5 7 , 5 7 7  
1 8 7 6  
B e l g i u m  \ 9 6 0  
5 1  
3 2  
1 9 . 7 8 9 , 8 0 1 , 4 0 4  
7 2 0 , 2 1 3  
1 7 7 8  
S p a i n  1 9 6 8  
4 3  
E q u a t o r i a l  
N o t  
I  
7 2  
Guinea Permitted I 
33 Gabon 2009 17,051,616,749 1,534,262 France 1960 51 
Sao Tome Not 
34 and Principe Permitted 248,286.778 168,526 1471 Portugal 1975 36 
Nortl Africa 
35 Algeria 2009 188,681,099.191 35,980,193 1848 France 1962 49 
36 Egypt 2008 229,530,568,260 82,536,770 1882 Britain 1922 89 
37 Libya 2010 6,422.772 1912 Italy 1951 60 
France and 
38 Morocco 2008 100,221,001,988 32,272,974 1909 Spam 1956 55 
Not Britain and 
39 Sudan Permitted 64,053,368,930 34,318,385 1820 Egypt 1955 56 
I 
Not 
40 Tunisia Permitted 45,863,804,800 10,673,800 1 1881 France 1956 55 
Soutt jern Africa 
41 Botswana 2007 17,327,510,032 2,030,738 1886 Britain 1966 45 





43 Namibia I 2005 12.300,698.895 2,324,004 1890 Africa 1990 21 
44 South Africa 2005 408.236,752,340 50,586.757 1806 Britain 1931 80 
45 Swaziland 2008 3,977,754,360 1,067,773 1903 Britain 1968 43 
46 Zimbabwe 2005 9,656,199,414 12,754,378 1809 Britain 1965 46 
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